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The Community Reinvestment Act has been used as a
vehicle to increase lending to low-income neighborhoods.
In this article, a conceptual framework is developed to
evaluate the effect of CRA on bank portfolios. Results
suggest that CRA will boost lending to low-income neigh-
borhoods, with the costofachieving the socialgoalofmore
even lending borne by bank customers and owners. The
increase in lending to low-income neighborhoods is rein-
forced by an information effect: as banks expend greater
effort searching for high-quality, low-income borrowers,
this increased knowledge about the area reduces risks in
that area.
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Over the last two decades, community groups and
Congress have expressed concern about "inadequate"
lending to disadvantaged neighborhoods. These groups
have argued that restrictive lending practices have led to
decay and blight in some neighborhoods because qualified
borrowers who would have made improvements could not
get loans.
The arguments have centered around "redlining," a
practice whereby a financial institution indiscriminately
limits loans for the purchase ofproperty in certain "unde-
sirable" neighborhoods within its market area. According
to this practice, lenders are alleged to deny loan applica-
tions for purchases in those geographic areas, regardless of
the credit worthiness oftheindividual borrower. Anumber
of statistically-based studies that purported to show evi-
dence of redlining were influential in securing passage of
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) as part of the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1977.
Since 1977, redlining, or the absence of redlining, has
occupied much of the attention of those investigating
CRA-related issues. In practice, however, protests by com-
munity groups based on CRA grounds have delayed or
prevented bank mergers and acquisitions even without
specific proof that a particular bank has engaged in red-
lining. Moreover, the implementation of CRA has tended
to encourage banks to make more loans in certain neigh-
borhoods, regardless of whether a given bank has been
shown to have engaged in redlining. Clearly, then, CRA
has implications for banks beyond its anti-redlining provi-
sions. Consequently, this article seeks to evaluate the
effects of CRA within this broader context, leaving aside
the questions whether CRA is necessary or whether red-
lining occurs. We develop a model to explain, first, why a
bank might have different lending policies for different
neighborhoods, and second, how the current approach
to CRA's enforcement affects a bank's decisions in this
regard.
Differential neighborhood lending patterns can be
shownto be arationalresponse to an environmentin which
27the costs of acquiring information are high and neighbor-
hoods differ widely in their average default risks. The
existence ofCRA suggests that society views these differ-
ential lending patterns as "suboptimal," and CRA en-
forcement essentially requires financial institutions to bear
the social cost ofproviding low-income borrowers greater
access to funding. Specifically, banks are encouraged
under CRA to increase lending in low-income neighbor-
hoods. To do so, they may incur highercosts investigating
the credit worthiness ofpotential borrowers in these areas
than would be optimal from the perspective of profit
maximization. CRA trades off bank profits for the social
benefits derived from greater access by borrowers in
disadvantaged neighborhoods.
This view ofCRA, as a mechanism to induce banks to
increase lending in low-income neighborhoods, is consis-
tentwithavarietyofinstitutionalresponses to CRA. These
responses can be interpreted as efforts to reduce the costs
that kept banks from making loans prior to CRA. Among
these responses are pooling agreements by banks and
cooperativeefforts betweenbanks andcommunitygroups.
We present an imperfect information model in Section I
to demonstrate conditions under which banks would
choose to allocate creditacross neighborhoods on the basis
of average neighborhood characteristics. The effects of
changes in information on the allocation of funds across
neighborhoods are explored in Section II. The role ofCRA
in the lending decision is highlighted in Section III,
where it is introduced as an.additional constraint on the
bank's choice. We discuss institutional arrangements that
have emerged to minimize the cost burden of CRA in
Section IV, and draw conclusions in Section V.
I. An Imperfect Information Model
The operations ofa bank are based on a broad spectrum
of factors and motivations, including maintaining the
goodwill of customers, serving the needs of the commu-
nity, and providing returns to investors. A central feature
ofcommercial banks is their role as credit intermediaries.
Banks develop expertise in evaluating the credit worthi-
ness ofborrowers and enjoy economies of scale in moni-
toring loans to ensure prudent behavior on the part of
borrowers. The extent to which this monitoring activity is
not performed easily or as efficiently by other participants
in the credit markets determines the market share of
banking relative to direct placement activity. 1
Portfoliodiversificationis anotherfactor inbanklending
decisions. Every loan faces some default risk associated
with the particular characteristics of the borrower or the
projectas well as overall economic conditions. A bankcan
reduce these risks, however, by diversifying its portfolio
since the specific risks of every project are not perfectly
correlated, and these risks tend to offset one another. As a
result, the total risk of a diversified portfolio is generally
less than that of an undiversified one.
Diversification can occur along many different dimen-
sions, such as across industries (agriculture, manufactur-
ing, services, etc.) and size categories (large corporations
or single proprietorships), and across general classifica-
tions of customers (residential, industrial, commercial,
etc.). Diversification also can be accomplished geograph-
ically, bylending to similarcustomers in different markets
or neighborhoods.
As commonly expressed, the problemof"sociallyinad-
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equate" lending to particular neighborhoods may arise
because the costs ofidentifying good loans in certain areas
outweigh the advantages that would be gained through
greater geographic diversification. This form of.credit
rationing, sometimes referred to as "rational redlining,"2
occurs-whenbanksrestrictlending orare less aggressive in
marketing loan products in certain neighborhoods because
the costs of identifying the qualified loans are too high
to be profitable. Thus, the lack ofreadily available, com-
plete information can·affect the allocation ofcredit across
neighborhoods.
In this model, we assume a bank operates in a geo-
graphic lending market comprising two neighborhoods,
which we denote bythe subscriptsR (for "rich")andP(for
"poor"). The bank divides its portfolio of loans between
the two neighborhoods, with proportion 6 allocated to
neighborhood P, and (1-6) to neighborhood R.
We define ip as the contractual interestrate on neighbor-
hoodP loans and iR as the contractual interestrate on loans
to residents of neighborhood R. 3 We assume that loan
markets are competitive and thatinterestrates on loans are
determined in these markets. Loan interest rates may be
affected by the underlying risks of projects in the two
neighborhoods, although they may not correct for risk
differentials exactly. We assume that the risk of a loan
projectin neighborhoodPexceeds that inneighborhoodR.
Consequently, the loan rate in neighborhood P may be
higher than that in neighborhood R.
The limit on banks' ability to tailor rates to reflect fully
the differences in neighborhood risks may arise for a
Economic Review / Summer 1990returns to loans in neighborhood P is higher than in
neighborhood R. This effect could be expected if income
streams in the poor neighborhood were more volatile.
Moreover, ifbanks operate less in low income areas, as is
alleged by CRA advocates, they can be expected to have
less information about neighborhood P.
The bank's estimate ofrisk to loans in the two neighbor-
hoods can be written as:
where rp and rR are actual returns on loans that would be
expected at the prevailing interest rates. (J"~ and (J"k repre-
sent the variances of loan returns in neighborhoods P and
R, respectively, that result from unobservable factors. We
can think of these measures as the full-information mini-
mum variances ofreturns of the portfolio the bank would
choose ifit had all the information available about possible
projects. For agiven interest rate, these components of the
variance are assumed to be fixed. The 'A terms in equations
(1) and (2) are the result ofthecomponentofrisk caused by
imperfect information, with 'Ap > 'AR .9 These terms are
dependent on the information the bank obtains about the
two neighborhoods, Ip and IR . Our assumption that infor-
mationreduces this componentofrisk suggests that 'A~ < 0
and 'A~ < O. We assume that 'Ap and 'AR are unaffected by
information about the other neighborhood. Thus, 'Ap is in-
dependent of IRand 'AR is independent of Ip.l°
Banks, therefore, can reduce loan risk by acquiring
more information about projects and borrowers in the two
neighborhoods so that they can weed out the higher-risk
projects. If information gathering were costless, they
would seek information about both neighborhoods until
'Ai = O.
But information gathering is not costless. Banks typ-
ically must set up an on-site branch or loan origination
office, conduct local surveys regarding the values ofneigh-
borhood properties, and solicit and evaluate loan applica-
tions from neighborhood residents-all functions that
entail significant expenditures by the bank.
We characterizethese informationgathering costs by the
average cost functions, Cp(Ip) and CR(IR). Total infor-
mation costs are equal to Cp(Ip)0 for neighborhood P and
CR (IR )(1-0) for neighborhood R. Typically, there are
large initial fixed costs associated with the investment in
information (such as setting up a branch), which lead to
declining average costs over some range. We assume,
however, that the marginal cost of obtaining information
variety ofreasons, including transaction costs or pressures
from social or regulatory groups. 4 Moreover, problems of
adverse selection, where higher rates may attract less
creditworthy borrowers, can preventbanks from adjusting
interest rates to compensate fully for risk.5,6
Finally, because much ofthe attention in the application
ofCRA is focused on home mortgage lending, the model
reflects some of the characteristics of that market. In
particular, while lenders can in principle charge differ-
ential rates across areas, in practice they tend to have only
slight variations in mortgage terms at any given point in
time. In large part, this leveling ofrates and terms results
from the desire of lenders to create homogeneous mort-
gage contracts that can be resold in secondary markets.
Because of these factors restricting interest rate differ-
entials, we assume that individual banks are price takers
and that rates are set exogenously. Thus, in this model, ip
and iR are not viewed as explicit choice variables by
the bank.?
In the absence of defaults, total dollar returns for the
bank on neighborhood Ploans are ipOL where L is the total
dollarvolume ofloans inthe bank'sportfolio. Similarly, the
income on neighborhoodR loans is iR(1-O)L. To simplify
the analysis, we assume that the volume ofloans is given.
We define unitssuch that L = 1and thus eliminate it from
the two expressions above. 8
Banks are assumed to maximize an objective function
that trades off risk and return. The bank's perception of a
loan's riskiness depends, first, on the actual distribution of
potential rates ofreturn to that loan project. This distribu-
tion depends on the interaction between specific character-
istics of the project and the realization of future random
events. (This distribution likely will change when the
interest rate changes.) Even with full information about
current conditions, the bank still faces risks from future
events.
Although the bank cannot observe this distribution and
therefore derive atrue measure of the loan's actual riski-
ness, it can estimate a project's riskiness by obtaining
information about the details of the individual project,
details that are observable at some cost to the bank. Thus, a
bank's estimate of a project's riskiness depends on the
amount of information gathered. Essentially, as the bank
invests in more information, its ability to distinguish
among borrowers and projects rises, allowing it to restrict
its portfolio to the lowest risk projects seeking loans at the
given contractual interest rate.
Riskcanbeexpectedto differ across neighborhoods. We
assume that, for a given interest rate, the variance of
VAR(rp) = (J"~ + 'Ap(Ip)
VAR(rR ) = (J"k + 'AR(IR)
(1)
(2)
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tion becomes more difficult to obtain or evaluate. This
produces V-shaped average and marginal cost curves.
We abstract from the deposit-taking activities of the
bank, even though this activity may affect the bank's cost
of funds and, thus, its profits. In effect, we assume a
perfectly elastic supply of deposits at a risk-free rate of
return to depositors, rd.ll As a result, we separate the
bank's deposit-taking function from the business ofmak-
ing loans.
With the components described above, it is possible to
state the bank's objective function as
Max'TI' = ipS + iR(I- S) - ~ var[rpS + rR(1- S))
- Cp (Ip )8 - CR (IR)(1-S)-rd (3)
where 'TI' is the bank's adjusted return. 'TI' must be positive
for the bank to operate. The bank chooses values ofS, Ip ,
andIR that maximize this expression.
The objective function in (3) asserts that the bank seeks
a balance between a portfolio's interest income, informa-
tion costs, and variance. In this case, we assume that the
adjusted return depends negatively on portfolio variance.
This effect could arise for a variety of reasons, including
risk aversion on the part of banks.12 In addition, bank-
ruptcy costs resulting from failed projects can be expected
to make portfolio risk a negative factor to the bank. The
third term, therefore, reflects a reduction in the bank's
incomefrom expectedloanlosses to its portfolio, whichfor
simplicity is assumed to be a constant multiple, ~, ofthe
bank's portfolio variance. 13
This formulation differs from other models of credit
allocation. For example, as discussed in the box, "Imper-
fect Information vs. CreditRationing," the standard credit
rationing model focuses on the effects of asymmetric
information on the determination of loan rates and the
decision to exclude or ration credit to various borrower
groups. The current work, which should be viewed as
complementary to this credit rationing model, focuses on
the process by which information gathering changes credit
allotments. Moreover, the structure of this model is de-
signed explicitly to model the effect of eRA, which is
difficult to incorporate directly into the credit rationing
framework. Nevertheless, many ofthe implications ofthe
credit rationing model can be expected to carry over into
this analysis as well.
The solution of(3) yields the following optimal condi-
tions for a bank's portfolio allocation and information
gathering:
ip - iR + CR - Cp + 213[var(rR )] (4) S* = -=-----~_=_=_----:.':-:---.:..----:--'--:_::__----'.:..-
213[var(rp ) + var(rR )]
32
(5)
C~(l~) = - ~(1- S)A~(I~) (6)
Equations (4) to (6) represent equilibrium first-order
conditions for the three choice variables, which are simul-
taneously determined and clearly interdependent. By to-
tally differentiating equations (4) to (6), it is possible to
solve for reduced form expressions that calculate the effect
ofchanges in exogenous variables and model parameters
on the equilibrium values of the choice variables. We
presentthese comparative statics results in the Appendix.
The solution to the model suggests several factors
that influence a bank's allocation of loans across neigh-
borhoods:
• The banklends alargerproportion ofits loanportfolio
in the poorneighborhood when thecontractualinterestrate
on neighborhoodP loans rises relative to that on neighbor-
hood R loans.
• When the variance of neighborhood P returns falls
relative to that in neighborhoodR, the proportion ofloans
in neighborhood P rises. Assuming that the risk-adjusted
return to lending in the rich neighborhood is higher before
Var(rp ) declines, the relative advantage of the wealthier
neighborhood is eroded.14 Similarly, factors that reduce
the cost of obtaining information about neighborhood P
relative to that for neighborhoodR increase the proportion
ofloans to neighborhood P. Clearly, ifinformation is less
costly to obtain in one area, more information is acquired,
thereby reducing the relative variance of returns to that
neighborhood.
• The effect of an increase in risk aversion (or the
expected default rate) is less clear and depends, among
other things, on the spread between contractual interest
rates and differences in variances ofthe two neighborhood
returns. As ~ rises, the value of reducing the portfolio's
variance rises, pushing the solution toward the minimum
variance portfolio. For low initial levels ofS, the effect of
an increase in 13 is to shift the portfolio toward neighbor-
hood P loans to capture the advantages ofportfolio diver-
sification. At high values of S, similar diversification
incentives shift the loan portfolio toward neighborhood R
loans.
The solution to the model is depicted graphically in
Figure 1. The figure shows how differentallocations across
neighborhoods affect profits, holding constant the optimal
quantities ofinformation,ItandII. Thecurvelabelled 'TI'p
represents the portion of adjusted returns attributable to
lending in neighborhood P. The 'TI'R curve is the equivalent
measure for neighborhoodR loans. The curve marked 'TI' is
the vertical sum ofthe 'TI'p and 'TI'R curves, representing the
Economic Review / Summer 1990bank's total profits as afunction of e. Ate= 0, the entire
bankportfolio is allocated to neighborhoodR loans and the
total adjusted return is thus equal to 'ITR . Conversely, at
e = 1, the bank's portfolio consists entirely of loans to
neighborhood P projects and total returns are derived from
'ITp . The twofunctions, 'ITp and 'ITR are concave in e.l5Their
curvature creates the total return function that, in the
current figure, rises over some portion of values of e, and
then falls. The profit-maximizing bankchooses the highest
point on the total return curve, with an optimal credit
allocation equal to e*.
Factors that raise the marginal profit ofneighborhood P
loans relative to that ofneighborhoodRloans will increase
e*. For example, an increase in ip relative to iR , or a de-
crease in the variance of rp relative to that of rR will rotate
71'p upward, and tend to move e* to the right. An increase
in 13 will increase the concavity of both profit functions,
and e* will increase if it was very low initially and if the
increased concavity raised the marginal profit ofneighbor-
hood P loans more than that for neighborhood R loans.
In the solution shown in Figure 1, neighborhoodP is not
redlined, that is, the optimal credit allocation implies
1>e>0.Itispossible, however,to derivearedlinedsolution
in the current framework. Redlining will occur if the
marginal profit from lending to the poor neighborhood,
represented by the slope ofthe 71'p function, is less than the
absolute value of the slope ofthe 'ITR function at low levels
of e. In such a case, the total return function slopes
downward over its entire length, with a maximum value
occurring ate= O. In this case, the profit-maximizing bank
would allocate all of its loans to neighborhood R projects
and would redline neighborhood P.
II. The Effect ofInformation
The equilibrium lending pattern across neighborhoods,
shown in Figure 1, is directly affected by the information
gathering process. As we demonstrate in this section, the
equilibrium values of all three choice variables are highly
interdependent, with optimal investment in information
aboutboth neighborhoods determined simultaneously with
the decision about portfolio shares.
The optimal investment in information about the two
neighborhoods is closely related to the portfolio allocation
decision. The first-orderconditions forIp andIR' equations
Figure 1
Optimal Credit Allocation in the
Imperfect Information Model
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco 33(5) and (6), suggest that the bank should invest in informa-
tion until the marginal cost of the last units acquired (the
left-hand sides) just equals the value of the reduced port-
folio risk (the right~hand sides). (Note in equations (5) and
(6) that A~ < 0 and q > 0).
Comparative statics results for the information choice
variables, derived in the Appendix, show several factors
that affect the optimal information acquisition:
• The amount of information acquired is positively
related to the shareofloans allocatedto that neighborhood.
Thus, 6andIp move together. Wheneverthe bank allocates
more ofits loan portfolio to the poor neighborhood, it also
is in the bank's interestto acquire more information about
neighborhood P borrowers and projects. Because more of
the portfolio is at risk in the neighborhood, the marginal
benefit ofinformation about that neighborhood rises. Any
factor that raises the optimal value of 6, such as a relative
increase in contractual interest rates on neighborhood P
loans or adecrease in the risk ofneighborhood P projects,
also will induce the firm to obtain more information about
the poor neighborhood. 16
• The amount ofinformation purchased also depends on
the degree to which more information reduces portfolio
variance. If additional information about neighborhood P
becomes less valuable because some exogenous factor
negatively affects the bank's perception about the neigh-
borhood's risk, the marginal benefit falls. The bank then
reduces the amount ofinformation itobtains about the poor
neighborhood, and allocates less ofits portfolio to neigh-
borhoodPloans. The oppositeeffectoccurs ifthe marginal
benefit ofIR falls; that is, the bank responds by increasing
its allocation of loans to the poor neighborhood and pur-
chasing more information about neighborhood P These
results suggest·that information investment in the two
neighborhoods is achoice between substitutes: factors that
raise the value of information in one neighborhood also
reduce the relative value of information about the other
neighborhood. This result is dependent on our assumption
that information about one neighborhood does not affect
the variance of projects in the other neighborhood.
• Factors that reduce the marginal cost of information
for one neighborhood will increase investment in informa-
tion in that neighborhood. As discussed in Section IV,
pooling arrangements and collaboration with community
groups can reduce the marginal cost of information to an
individual bank. Banks will then increase information to
balance marginal costs and benefits.
• Finally, the solution to the model depends on the
relationship between defaults and portfolio variance.· Ob-
viously, ifthere were no defaults, (thatis, 13 = 0) the bank
Figure 2
Effect of Positive Information
Shock to Neighborhood P
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Economic Review / Summer 1990would not invest in information at all. Information is only
valuable for its variance-reducing content. As the sensitiv-
ity of adjusted returns to portfolio variance increases, that
is, as J1 rises, the value of information rises, and the bank
invests in more information about both neighborhoods.
The role of information gathering in our model can be
seen in Figure 2. The black curves represent the initial
equilibrium depicted in Figure 1. We suppose that a
positive shock occurs to neighborhood P that raises the
return to information. For example, a firm announces its
intention to build a manufacturing plant in neighborhood
P, with plans to hire many local workers. This announce-
ment should lead to better income prospects for neighbor-
hood P residents, and raise the credit quality ofthe pool of
applicants in that neighborhood. The assumed shock to
neighborhood P increases the bank's perception of the
marginal benefits of additional information. (This implies
that A~ increases in absolute value as a result of the
announcement.)
The higher marginal benefit ofinformation about neigh-
borhood P induces more investment in that information.
As a result, 'ITp shifts upward. The higher profit schedule,
therefore, boosts the optimal e. The rise inealso boosts the
marginal benefit of information in neighborhood P, while
reducing the marginal benefit of information in neighbor-
hood R, thereby reinforcing the initial information shock.
The bank responds by increasing the information invest-
ment in the poor neighborhood even more, further shifting
the 'ITp curve in Figure 2 up to the green line. At the same
time, the marginal benefit to neighborhood R information
falls relative to its marginal cost. The bank reduces its in-
formation investment in the rich neighborhood, resulting
in a downward shift of the 'ITR curve in Figure 2. The new
equilibrium implies that the bank responds to the positive
shock in the poorneighborhood byraising theportion ofits
portfolio allocated to neighborhood P loans, increasing
the amount of information purchased about neighborhood
P, and reducing the information investment in neighbor-
hoodRY
This imperfectinformation framework may shedlight on
empirical studies claiming to find evidence of neighbor-
hood redlining. Given the cost ofobtaining information, it
would not be surprising to observe banks using general
neighborhood characteristics to evaluate return functions,
as well as to assess information costs. This type of infor-
mation is widely available at relatively low cost. To the
extent that racial and other social characteristics are corre-
lated with overall economic variability, returns can appear
to be a direct function.of these characteristics. Moreover,
as the costs of finding the lowest risk loans rise, the
potential for credit rationing increases in neighborhoods
with characteristics correlated with higher risks. Use of
these characteristics as a screening device may therefore
represent a first guess by lenders as to default risk in
different neighborhoods. Once banks choose (or are in-
duced) to make more substantial investments in infor-
mation, however, the relevance of general neighborhood
characteristics may give way to more costly borrower- or
project-specific data that carry more information content.
In the context of our model, CRA represents one such
inducement.
III. The Role of eRA
CRA can be considered an additional regulatory con-
straint imposed on banks, thereby affecting their optimal
portfolio allocation across neighborhoods. As we show in
this section, the basic model presented in Section I can be
easily modified to capture the essential features of CRA.
Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act
partially in response to community groups' claims that
previous anti-discrimination laws had failed to keep banks
from redlining. Afinancial institution is said to redline ifit
indiscriminately denies loans for the purchase of property
in certain "undesirable" neighborhoods within its market
area. In hearings prior to the drafting of what became the
CRA, statistically-based studies were presented (New
York Public Interest Research Group, 1977; National Peo-
ples Action, 1976) that claimed to confirm the existence of
redlining, despite the earlier passage of the Equal Credit
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco
Opportunity Act (1974) and the Home Mortgage Dis-
closure Act (1975).
Itis true that those earlierlaws may notprovide effective
sanctions againstredlining. While the EqualCreditOppor-
tunity Act prohibits discrimination in credit transactions
on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex,
marital status, and age, it does not outlaw geographic
discrimination. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act re-
quires financial institutions to disclose data on the volume
of mortgage loans by census tract or zip code, but does not
proscribe geographically discriminatory loan policies.
CRArequires federal regulators to motivate commercial
banks and thrift institutions to meet community credit
needs by considering a financial institution's record of
community lending when they evaluate its applications for
mergers or acquisitions. Members of the public also may
35emerged. The regulatory mandate requires that financial
institutions search harder for good loans in disadvantaged
neighborhoods, but does not outlaw the rationing ofcredit
orrequire banks to make riskier loans. The law imposes on
banks and thrifts the costs associated with expending the
effort to seek out high-quality borrowers in areas that are
perceived as riskier.
In this "effort-oriented" approach, a bank is penalized
for noncompliance with CRA if it demonstrates insuffi-
cient efforts tomeet the credit needs ofthe community it
serves. The penaltiestake theform ofdelays inprocessing,
or even denial of, applications for mergers and acquisi-
tions. CRA examination ratings consider the extent to
which the bank conducts outreach programs, educates
the public on its policies, and aggressively markets its
products in low-income neighborhoods.
Effort, however, may not translate into a greateramount
offunds lent to poorer neighborhoods. Recent CRA pro-
tests, therefore, have focused more on results than on
effort. Challenges to bank mergers and acquisitions on
CRA grounds have been raised when community groups
have claimed that those institutions failed to meet a
"socially acceptable" minimum level oflending in lower-
income neighborhoods. In order to avoid the eRA "pen-
alty," banks have responded with specific commitments of
loanfunds to those neighborhoods.
Modelling eRA
Inmodelling the effectofCRA, itis necessary to choose
between the regulatory interpretation and the more recent
results-oriented application ofCRA. An "effort-oriented"
approach would focus on the amount of information the
bank acquires. In contrast, a "results-oriented" approach
emphasizes 8, the proportion ofthe portfolio allocated to
the low-income neighborhood. We have chosen to model
the latter interpretation.
In the contextofourimperfect informationmodel, CRA
has the effect ofestablishing a minimum proportion ofthe
bank loan portfolio allocated to the poor neighborhood.
The value of this minimum allotment is determined by a
social welfare function that is exogenous to ourmodel. We
refer to the socially acceptable minimum level of credit
allocated to the poor neighborhood as e. We assume that
CRA imposes a penalty on the bank. (delays in processing
applications, negative publicity,etc.) ifit fails to allocate
at leastthis proportionofits loanportfolioto neighborhood
Ploans. We characterize this penalty by the function:
formally protestan application ifthey thinkthat the institu-
tion's record with regard to lending in certain neighbor-
hoods is unsatisfactory.
The primary purpose of CRA, which is expressed in
purposefully vague language, is subject to debate. An
often-used, narrow interpretation is that CRA is an anti-
redlining bill. In this view, the critical issue becomes one
of identifying clear evidence that banks engage in irra-
tional redlining. Otherwise, enforcement of CRA is not
needed.
The evidence in redlining studies is inconclusive. Sev-
eral studies have found average neighborhood racial and
other social characteristics to be significantly correlated
with lending activity even after controlling for a variety of
other influences. However, these studies have been crit-
icized for excluding important variables or using incorrect
data-factors that can lead to overestimates ofthe impor-
tance of race or other social factors in neighborhood
lending. (For a discussion of empirical studies of red-
lining, see the box entitled "Evidence ofRedlining.")
CRA is viewed more broadly in this study, however.
Rather than an anti-redlining law, CRA is viewed here as a
mechanism to increase disadvantaged neighborhoods' ac-
cess to credit whether or not redlining was actually occur-
ring. This broader view of CRA is consistent with two
recent developments. In February 1989, the Federal Re-
serve Board denied on CRA grounds an application by
Continental Illinois to acquire another institution, even
though Continental Illinois was not believed to be engaged
in redlining per se.
Also, in 1989, the federal regulatory agencies18 revised
the guidelines for compliance with the CRA, and estab-
lished more stringent and specific standards. However,
because CRA requires that lending be consistent with
"safety and soundness" considerations, even the new
guidelines do not delineate an acceptable geographic pat-
tern oflending. Inthe initial statement ofthe CRA, twelve
criteria were to be used in evaluating a lender's record·of
compliance. One ofthe criteria states thatregulators are to
consider "the geographic distribution ofthe bank's credit
extensions, credit applications, and credit denials." The
1989 amendment refers to "unwarranted geographic dif-
ferences in lending patterns," and to "disparities in
lending. that do not appear to be attributable to safety
and soundness considerations or to factors beyond an in-
stitution's controL" What would make these geographic
differences unwarranted or unattributable to safety and
soundness considerations is not stated.
In light of this broader perspective onCRA, two alter-
native interpretations of the application of CRA have
d(e - 8)
whered(.»Owhen8<e,andd(.) = owhen 8 ? e.
(7)
36 Economic Review / Summer 1990Federal Reserve Bank. of Francisco 37The post-CRA net return function for the bank, there-
fore, becomes:
'IT = ipO + iR(l-O) - [3var[rpO+ rR(l-O)]
- Cp(Ip)O - CR(IR)(l-O) - d(e-O) - rd (8)
and the optimal portfolio share in neighborhood P loans
becomes:
o _. ip - iR + CR - Cp + 2[3[var(rR)] + d
eRA - 2[3[var(rp) + var(rR)] (9)
The only difference between (4) and (9) is that d now
appears as an argumentinthe numerator. As thepenalty for
allocating ~oo little credit to neighborhood Pincreases, the
bank:s optl~al sh~e of lending to P rises accordingly.
WIth the ImposItIon ofthe CRA penalty, where binding,
the post-CRA value of 0 exceeds the value obtained in
Section Iby the ratio ofthe penalty to the weighted sum of
the return variances, thus increasing the bank's lending in
the poor neighborhood. The bank now treats the CRA
penalty as an additional cost of doing business and, in
effect, chooses the optimal penalty.
The influence of CRA on the model's solution is de-
picted graphically in Figure 3. Again, the solid curves
represent an initial equilibrium, with 0* the pre-CRA
optimal portfolio allocation. In the presence of the CRA
penalty, the returns to neighborhood R loans are reduced
for all portfolio allocations below "6. The bankmust pay the
CRA penalty for not allocating a sufficient amount of its
portfolio to neighborhood P loans. This is shown in Figure
3by the do~nward shift ofthe 'ITR function for all values of
oless than 0.Ourassumption thatthe penalty increases the
further 0* is from the social optimum is presented by the
increasing distance between the black and green curves as
oapproaches zero.
As the CRA penalty shifts down a portion of the 'IT
function, it als~ shifts the totalreturnfunction for all value~
of 0 less than O. The profit-maximizing bank chooses the
highest point on the total return function, in this case
corresponding to the value 0CRA. This portfolio allocation
is clo.ser to the socially optimal value of 0than the original
solutlo~. CRA thus has the desired impact of raising the
proportIOn of the bank's portfolio allocated to neighbor-
hood Ploans. Moreover, the largerthe penalty, the larger is
the resulting shift in the portfolio allocation.
The achievement ofthis goal, however, comes at acost.
Total returns for the bank are smaller after the imposition
of CRA (as long as the CRA constraint is binding and the
actual, as opposed to perceived, risks oflending in neigh-
?orhood P are higher than those in neighborhood R). CRA
Imposes an additional cost on the bank and induces it to
increase its lending to the neighborhood with the higher
expected return variance. Total returns decline because this
Figure 3
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default. From the bank's standpoint, CRA has an unde-
sirable impact. In essence, CRA forces the bank to pay
the social cost of increased lending to the poor neigh-
borhood. 19
One beneficial side-effect of CRA is its impact on
information gathering. Figure 3does not show the separate
information effects that augment the impact ofthe penalty.
Banks seek to reduce the penalty by raising e, which in
turn raises the marginal benefitofinformation in neighbor-
hood P. Banks, therefore, invest more in Ip and less in IR'
The change in information investment shifts the '1Tp and '1TR
curves as in Figure 2, reinforcing the increase in 6CRA' and
moving itclosertoa. Thus, the ability to investininforma-
tion moves the equilibrium credit allocation even closer to
the socially desired value than is shown in Figure 3.
This informational effect of CRA potentially can miti-
gate some of the cost of complying with the law. Ifthe
bank's initial perception ofthelow-income neighborhood's
risk was too high, CRA's incentive to gather more informa-
tion can lead the bank to discover that there are far more
high-quality loans that can be made in the area than it
initially believed. Of course, the increased information
also may confirm the bank's initial characterization of the
neighborhood's risk. And, in fact, if credit quality is too
low, the bank may choose to redline and pay the regulatory
penalty.
CRA's effect on information, as modeled here, also
achieves the "effort-oriented" enforcement of CRA.
Banks are encouraged to aggressively seek loans to boost
their portfolio of low-income neighborhood loans, thus
satisfying the regulatory interpretation of the law.
IV. Implications and Institutional Developments
One particularly attractive feature oftheimperfect infor-
mation model is its potential to explain the emergence of
post-CRA institutional arrangements. The model suggests
that socially suboptimal lending occurs in part because the
costs of finding good loans are too high, not necessarily
because good loans cannot be made in a particular neigh-
borhood.
A predictable response of banks to this new regulatory
constraint is to seek ways to minimize the cost and risks of
complying with CRA regulations. Several arrangements
have emerged in the financial community to reduce the cost
ofCRA compliance. First, as an explicit response to CRA,
financial institutions in a number of states have formed
multi-institution consortia20 which not only lower the per-
institution cost of information, but allow participants to
share credit risks. A prime example is the California
Community Reinvestment Corporation, in which major
lenders in the state have pooled funds in a separate entity
whose sole directive is to find and make loans in disadvan-
taged neighborhoods. Since these same individual institu-
tions perform many othertypes ofloan functions in-house,
it is clear (and is sometimes explicitly stated) that the
establishment of such consortia serves the purposes of
lowering per-institutioncosts ofinformation and ofspread-
ing risk in alending process where such costs and risks are
relatively high.
Second, some banks allow non-profit community groups
to perform the initial applicant screening for CRA-related
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loans. 21 This approach lowers the costs of information for
the lending institution by shifting part of the search and
monitoring costs to the community groups. This approach
also may reduce default risks since the community group,
by placing its "reputational capital" on the line, has an
interest in encouraging the borrowerto follow the terms of
the loan. Italso increases community group sensitivity to
the credit-risk problems faced by institutions when lending
in certain areas.
Third, some banks form separate corporations for CRA
activity which allow banks to take equity positions in the
borrower as well as debt positions. 22 Joint loan-equity
positions, when they are possible, have been shown to
increase the monitoring and information gathering ca-
pability of the lender.23,24
Two points are particularly interesting with regard to all
ofthese arrangements. First, these strategies are explicitly
targeted at CRA and are not widely applied to other
lending problems. Second, all ofthese strategies are aimed
at reducing the costs of obtaining neighborhood informa-
tion and possibly at spreading risk.
The model provides an explanation for these arrange-
ments and an interpretation of their effects on lending to
disadvantaged neighborhoods. Consider, first, apost-CRA
arrangement in which a number of banks pool their re-
sources to obtain and share information about the poor
neighborhood. Ifwe assume thatNbanksparticipate in the
consortium (each as an equal partner), then for each unit of
39information the individual bank purchases, it receives
N - I units through the consortium sharing agreement. In
effect, for a given quantity of information, the cost to the
individual bank is split among N institutions. The neigh-
borhood P cost function thus becomes Cp(Ip)/N. Max-
imizing the modified adjusted return function yields the
following solution for 8:25
C
ip-iR+Cr - if + 2~[var(rR)] + d
8POOL = 2~[var(rp) + var(rR)] (10)
For a given quantity ofIp , eis unambiguously larger than
in the previous case where each bank obtains neighbor-
hood P information on its own. Clearly, if information
costs are lower, the optimal perceived return function for
the bank is higher. (In fact, ifN becomes so large that per-
institution costs become very small, the return function
may approach the full-information returns function, and
problems caused by imperfect information may be fully
mitigated.)
Referring back to the diagrammatic treatment, adecline
in information costs acts the same way as that portrayed in
Figure 2. Because the marginal cost of a given amount of
information falls with pooling, the optimal amount of
information gathered rises and the marginal profitfunction
for neighborhood P loans shifts outward, generating an
increase in lending to that neighborhood.
Pooling arrangements increase the total amount ofinfor-
mation gathered. To see this, consider the first-order
condition for neighborhoodP information and theresulting
partial equilibrium solution for marginal cost:
(11)
For a given value of neighborhood P information, the
marginal cost is lower than in the previous case, and
probably lower than the marginal benefit of investing in
information. Each bank in the consortium faces a private
incentive to investin more information since they share the
costs. The net result is a quantity of Ip that is greater
than the case without the consortium. The cost-pooling
arrangement thus yields a greater investment in informa-
tion than the case where all banks operate alone. Such
pooled arrangements appear to be particularly cost-effec-
tive mechanisms for overcoming problems of imperfect
information in lending markets.
Although such methods may minimize the costs ofCRA
compliance, it is important to emphasize that participating
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banks still can be expected to be worse offcompared to the
no-CRA case. If pooling arrangements yielded profits
similar to those in the wealthier areas, banks would have
had an incentive to form joint ventures before CRA was
adopted.
That consortia form under CRA and not without CRA
suggests several properties ofthe cost function. There are
economies of scale in information that were not exploited
previously. Thus, abank's costs can be reduced by sharing
information, increasing total information while cutting
individual information gathering. Moreover, the minimum
efficient scale oflending necessary to satisfy CRA may be
too high for one bank to enter separately and make normal
profits. The consortium, in contrast, may be able to attain a
scale of lending activity sufficient to make CRA-related
lending profitable. Finally, the costs offorming and main-
taining alending consortium may havepreventedpre-CRA
arrangements of this type. The benefits of reducing the
CRA penalty, however, act to offset these costs.
This result suggests that even with pooling arrange-
ments, profits are lower under CRA. Otherwise, (a) it
would not be necessary to form consortia, or (b) if the
expected return to lending in the neighborhood is suf-
ficiently high, such consortia would have formed with-
outCRA.
The other arrangements, that is, the involvement of
community groups and the use of greater equity control,
offer similar advantages in reducing information costs.
Community groups may have lower costs of finding good
borrowers because of their familiarity with the neighbor-
hood and the potential borrowers. Greater equity control
offers lower monitoring costs to the bank, although it does
not reduce the initial information cost offinding the loans.
The two mostprominentmethods, the use ofcommunity
groups and bank-pooling arrangements differ in their dis-
tribution of costs. The use ofcommunity groups is attrac-
tive to banks since the information costs are passed along
to the community and not borne directly by the bank.
However, to the extent that banks have a comparative
advantage in identifying good loans, that approach may be
less efficient. The costs of bank pooling operations are
directly borne by the stockholders or customers of the
banks, but they have greater control over the lending
process.
Other potential arrangements also can be envisioned
within this framework. Ifthe costs ofcomplying with so-
cial goals put banks at acompetitivedisadvantage, itmight
be appropriate to use government funds to subsidize the
Economic Review / Summer 1990cost of gathering information, rather than effectively tax-
ingbanks as occurs atpresent. Government agencies could
assist community group efforts in screening, or they could
subsidize information costs or risks through tax credits. In
such ways, the costs ofsocial policy can be directly trans-
ferred to society, rather than indirectly through the effect
on bank costs, which are borne by bank customers and
owners.
v. Summary and Conclusions
In this article, we incorporate CRA policies explicitly in
amicroeconomic model ofbank behavior. We demonstrate
that CRA can be viewed as an additional cost or tax on
banks when they fail to achieve some socially desirable
balance of lending across neighborhoods. Moreover, part
ofthe effectivenessofCRA derives from its inducements
to banks to increase lending in disadvantaged neighbor-
hoods-costs that it would not otherwise undertake if
CRA were not imposed.
Previous studies have not explicitly modeled the linkage
between bank behavior and CRA. Instead, for the most
part, they have dealt with the empirical question whether
neighborhoods are rationed on the basis of non-economic
factors. These studies have been concerned not with how
CRA affects lending activity, but with whether CRA was
needed to correctsome systematic bias in lending patterns.
In the contextofourmodel, differences inneighborhood
lending patterns arise in response to differences in the
perceived risks oflendingin certain areas. Thus, given the
costs involved in obtaining information about neighbor-
hoods, these lending patterns may be optimal from the
standpoint ofaprivate, profit-maximizing bank. However,
our interpretation of the CRA suggests that it has been
invokedto overcome what is viewed as socially suboptimal
lending in disadvantaged neighborhoods.
The current study provides abetter understanding ofthe
relationship between bank behavior and the application of
the CRA. Results from this study lead to several conclu-
sions. First, CRA places the social cost of more geo-
graphically even lending directly on banks. Banks are, in
effect, taxed in suchaway as to force them to achieve social
goals, with bank customers or shareholders paying the cost
ofthe policy.
Second, by imposing a penalty, CRA will increase
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lending to disadvantaged neighborhoods-aneffect that is
reinforced in the model by the assumption of imperfect
information. When banks are induced by CRA to increase
lending in the poor neighborhood, the value ofinformation
about that area rises. The induced investment in informa-
tion increases the bank's knowledge about the poor neigh-
borhood and may reveal additional low-risk loan projects.
Information effects thus raise the proportion of the port-
folio allocated to poor neighborhood loans over and above
the direct effect of the CRA penalty.
An important policy question arises: iflending patterns
are suboptimal from society's standpoint, is itefficient and
equitable to place the cost ofthat social policy on banks?
Other mechanisms can be found to lower the cost of
information about some neighborhoods, and banks could
be subsidized intheir information costs rather than taxed.
The policy question raised by this article is whether
CRA is the most efficient way to achieve this social goal.
Future researchers may wish to shift their focus from
whether lending to various neighborhoods is sufficient, to
comparing the relative advantages of other mechanisms
that can remove the informational inefficiencies that in-
hibit the desired investing activity.
Moreover, the "penalty function" implicit in CRA
offers only one incentive structure for banks to increase
their search activity. This approach, which offers vague
regulatory penalties on mergers and acquisitions, may not
offerthe most efficientincentives to banks to increase their
lending to disadvantaged neighborhoods. By starting from
a clear understanding of the cause of the suboptimal
lending-namely, differential risks, exacerbated by costly
information-the incentive structure to achieve that goal
can be crafted more efficiently.
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1. See, for example, James (1987).
2. Sullivan and Pozdena (1982) make the distinction be-
tween rational redlining, where differential lending occurs
as a result of differences in future prospects of borrowers
or projects, and irrational redlining. The latter is arbitrary
and discriminatory. In our model, only rational redlining
occurs.
3. This return includes the explicit interest charged on
loans as well as other fees and payments. that may be
required by the lender. These fees include such items
as closing costs, origination fees, prepaid interest, .etc.
Booth (1990) finds that loan fees play an important role in
the pricing of bank commercial loans and that loan fees
assume an extensive variety of forms.
4. Although banks have considerable latitude to vary
interest rates, collateral requirements, and various fees,
some flexibility may be sacrificed to gain advantages of
scale through standardization. Moreover, recent work by
Jaffee and Russell (1990) suggests that lenders may be
limited in their ability to differentiate loan terms because of
social pressures regarding "fairness," as well as legal
limits associated with discrimination.
5. According to the notion of adverse selection, increases
in interest rates may discourage safer borrowers and
attract riskier ones who have a lower probability of repay-
ing the loan. The increase in interest rates has an adverse
effect on the quality of loan applicants and may actually
lead to lower expected returns for lenders (after account-
ing for defaults). This adverse selection effect limits the
extent to which interest rates can reflect loan risk. See the
box on Imperfect Information vs. Credit Rationing.
6. In the credit rationing literature, Stiglitz and Weiss
(1987) implicitly argue that banks choose to allocate
credit sequentially to different borrower classes. The bank
chooses a loan rate to each class that maximizes the
expected utility (return) from loans to that group, tak-
ing into account the adverse selection problem. Conse-
quently, rates differto different groups, but the differences
in rates are not necessarily constructed to yield the same
expected return.
7. Although this assumption may appear quite restrictive,
relaxing it does not affect the general nature of the results.
As long as rates do not fully reflect underlying risks,
changes in risk will affect expected returns to the bank. In
the model discussed here, changes in variance induced
by information do not affect loan rates. This can be gener-
alized easily by making loan rates adirect function of risk,
in which case there would be some partially offsetting
effect on loan rates. This would reduce the magnitude of
the effect on portfolio allocation resulting from achange in
risk, but it would not change the direction of the effect.
8. In practice, the volume of loans is an endogenous
variable that may be at least partially determined by the
bank's deposit-taking activities in the two neighborhoods.
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For purposes of this discussion, however, the assumption
of an exogenous total loan volume is not crucial.
9: Information problems may be more acute in the poor
neighborhood if banks have fewer branches in those
areas. A smaller deposit base makes branching in poor
neighborhoods less profitable. In this way, deposit-taking
activity can exacerbate information asymmetries across
neighborhoods and impinge on the lending decisions.
10. Although this assumption simplifies the ensuing anal-
ysis,it is somewhat restrictive. At the very least, we believe
that any covariance between these errors is likely to be
positive, arelationship that mitigates somewhat, but does
not change, the predictions of the model presented be-
low. Negative cross correlations between neighborhood
information sets seem unlikely.
11. This assumption is not unreasonable given that de-
posit insurance in U.S. banking markets has covered
virtually 100 percent of deposits.
12. An alternative reason for the negative relationship
between returns and variance has to do with the nature of
the debt contract. The probability of default rises with
variance, as does the probability of a high payoff to the
project owner or borrower. Since lenders cannot receive
more than the loan rate when favorable outcomes occur,
they are not compensated for the increased probability of
default. Thus, lenders' returns have a truncated distribu-
tion, the mean of which falls as the variance of returns to
project owners rises. This is true even ifthe rising variance
is mean preserving.
13. Clearly, the expected loss parameter ~ could be an
increasing function of the portfolio's variance. In that case,
the loss associated with having greater variance would be
higher than in the case derived here, further encouraging
the movement away from the riskier neighborhood.
14. The share of loans made in neighborhood P also
increases as the full-information variance of returns in R
rises: as (J~ -) 00, e--> 1. An interesting case arises when
the two neighborhoods are identical. In this case, vari-
ances of returns in the two areas are the same, as are the
information cost functions and the interest rates on loans.
In this setting, the bank allocates half of its loan portfolio to
each neighborhood. Since there are neither greater loan
risks in one neighborhood relative to the other nor greater
costs of obtaining information, the bank treats both areas
the same in its lending activity.
15. The concavity of these return functions can be shown
using the full solution to the model presented in the Ap-
pendix. We assume, for simplicity, that the two functions
are monotonic. Thus, 1Tp rises continuously aseincreases
while 1TR falls as e rises. It is possible that these two
functions might be sufficiently concave to slope down-
ward at their ends, a possibility that only reinforces the
results presented here.
Economic Review / Summer 199016. We assume that the economies of scale in information
gathering drop off rapidly, in the sense that the negatively
sloped portion of the marginal cost schedule occurs only
at very low levels of Ip. In practice, banks would tend to
operate on the positively sloped portion of the marginal
cost curve, such that an increase in e increases the
amount of information acquired.
17. As long as the marginal benefit of information regard-
ing a particular neighborhood exceeds its marginal cost,
additional information will shift the return function from
that neighborhood upward. Once information investment
reaches the optimum, however, any additional investment
in information will reduce returns and the 'Tl' function will
shift downward.
18. These regulators include the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, and the Office of ThriftSupervision (formerly the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board).
19. Banks may be able to pass some of these costs on to
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their customers in the form of reduced services, higher
fees, etc. If costs are too high, in fact, a bank may choose
to drop the neighborhood as part of its market area, thus
passing the costs on to the community.
20. See Mannion and Faber (1989) p. 26.
21. See U.S. News &World Report (1989), pp. 26-27.
22. See Mannion and Faber (1989), p. 26.
23. See Kim (1989).
24. An alternative strategic response of banks could be to
close branches and limit their service area. Someevi-
dence of this effect is presented for the Phoenix metro-
politan area by Booth and Smith (1984), where CRA had a
negative impact on branching. Limits are imposed on this
ability, however, with community groups seeking regula-
tory prohibitions to such closures.
25. To the extent that pooling also spreads risks and
reduces the variance of low-income neighborhood loans
to pool participants, Var(rp) also may fall in expression
(10), further increasing e.
43APPENDIX
The three first-order conditions from the model yield a
system ofthree equations in three variables, e, Ip, and IR'
We can totally differentiate this 3-equation system and
then solve it in terms of the exogenous variables and
parameters of the model. The results of this exercise
represent the "complete" solutions to the model in that
they take account of all interactions among the variables.
In matrix notation, the system of three equations can be




[C~ + 21)(1-e)A~) ]
(0)
[ - I)(l- e)A~ - C~)
The solution for the vector, x, requires inverting matrix A,
i.e.,
x = A-ly.
The inversion process includes evaluating the determinant
ofA. In order to ascertain the signofthis determinant, it is
necessary to place certainrestrictions onthe magnitudes of
the second orderderivatives ofthe C(.) and A(.) functions
in the model. These restrictions entail requiring the
second-order own derivatives of these functions (with
respect to each neighborhood) to dominate second-order
cross effects (i.e., between neighborhoods). In addition,
we assume that first-order effects generally dominate sec-
ond-order effects. These restrictions are reasonable and
not likely to be violated.
With the above-imposed restrictions, we obtain the
following general form:





































Economic Review / Summer 1990We have also considered the impactofparameters that shift
the costs entailed in gathering information (a j ), the un-
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